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As a corrective to the emphasis on national and international reconciliation
during peace building processes, I develop here a conceptual analysis of the
dynamics of violence during the transition from war to peace and democracy
in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 2003 and 2006. I locate the
sources, at the local, national, and regional levels, of continued local violence
during this transition. Through an analysis of the situation in the provinces
of North Kivu and North Katanga, I illustrate how local dynamics interacted
with the national and regional dimensions of the conflict. I demonstrate that,
after a national and regional settlement was reached, some local conflicts over
land and political power increasingly became self-sustaining, autonomous,
and disconnected from the national and regional tracks. Thus, peace building
action was required not only at the national and regional levels but also locally.
Cet article plaide pour une correction de l’attention exclusive portée à la réconciliation
nationale et régionale lors des processus de paix. Je développe une analyse conceptuelle des
mécanismes de la violence durant les trois années officiellement consacrées à la transition de
la guerre à la paix et à la démocratie en République Démocratique du Congo (de 2003 à
2006). J’identifie, au niveau local, national et régional, les raisons pour lesquelles la violence
a perduré localement au cours de cette période. J’analyse la situation dans les provinces du
Nord Kivu et du Nord Katanga pour illustrer l’interaction entre les mécanismes de la
violence situés à ces différents niveaux. Je démontre que, après la signature d’accords de paix
nationaux et régionaux, certains conflits locaux portant sur les terres et le pouvoir politique
se sont progressivement dissociés des processus nationaux et régionaux et sont devenus
autonomes. Les programmes de résolution de conflits auraient donc du adresser les sources de
tensions au niveau local tout autant que les problèmes nationaux et régionaux.
A year after the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo officially ended on 30 June
2003, more than one thousand civilians continued to die every day. Most of the
deaths were caused by disease and malnutrition and could have been prevented if
outbursts of violence had not impeded access to humanitarian aid, especially in the
east (International Rescue Committee, 2004). In April 2004, for example, the United
Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs wrote the
following situation report:
The security situation was the most worrying this month in North-Kivu, South-Kivu and
Katanga Provinces in the Eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo … As a
consequence of the fighting and increased tension in these three regions, approximately 30-
35,000 people were estimated displaced over the course of this month. In addition to the
displacement, [the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] continued to
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receive reports of massacres, cannibalism, rapes, looting, extortion and other serious violations
of human rights being committed by various armed groups, leaving questions as to whether or
not the protection situation for civilians living in [the Congo] has improved since the war
officially ended last year.
Even though the situation improved somewhat in 2005 and 2006, similar reports of
tensions and local hostilities could be found in all weekly and monthly UN
humanitarian situation reports covering the Congolese transition from war to peace
and democracy (June 2003 – December 2006). What were the reasons for the
continuation of such a high level of violence?
In June 2003, a settlement seemed to have been reached at the regional and national
levels. The foreign troops that withdrew from the Congo in 2002 and 2003 officially
remained out of Congolese territory. Normal diplomatic ties, including the exchange
of ambassadors, resumed between former enemies. Important developments also
took place at the national level, such as the official reunification of the country, the
formation of a unified government, the preparation for democratic elections, and a
progressive integration of the different armed groups into a single national army.
However, local conflict – at the level of the village, the district, or the community –
persisted in the eastern Congo. Political, economic, and social antagonisms
generated frequent massacres, massive human rights violations, and population
displacement. Although some progress was made compared to the situation during
the war, a number of areas in the eastern Congo remained very unsafe, and many
Congolese continued to suffer from violence waged by one of the armed groups still
active. Why did the national and regional settlements fail to effect peace at the local
level?
Many of the international actors I interviewed, especially high-ranking diplomats
and UN staff members, do not believe that local causes played a decisive role in
sustaining national and regional violence during the war and in the post-war
period. During the transition, diplomats, UN staff, and many non-governmental
organisations worked mostly on the national and regional cleavages, mediating
among, and when necessary putting pressure on, the main Congolese, Rwandan,
and Ugandan political and military leaders. Their role at the local level was often
nonexistent (Autesserre, 2006).
This article argues for a correction of the emphasis on national and international
reconciliation during peace-building processes. National and international vio-
lence obviously factor into the establishment of peace. However, focusing on these
tensions at the expense of local conflicts is dangerous because local dynamics are
important triggers of violence and can become disconnected from the national and
international tracks. Nationally- and internationally-focused conflict resolution
overlooks important local dynamics that threaten order – or prevent its implementa-
tion in the first place.
The article will start with an analytical framework, then I shall seek to locate sources
at the local, national, and regional levels, of continued local violence during the
transition. I emphasise the importance and distinctiveness of local agendas in the
Congo as well as the local dimension of problems usually considered as purely
national and regional (i.e., the status of the Rwandophone minority and the
presence of the rebel Rwandan Hutu militias). Furthermore, I provide a brief
overview of the situation in North Kivu and North Katanga, in order to document


































level to the other. I also demonstrate that, after a national and regional settlement
was reached, some local conflicts over land, political power, and ethnic antagonism
increasingly became self-sustaining, autonomous, and disconnected from the
national and regional issues.
I draw on field observations in Kinshasa and the provinces of Katanga and the
Kivus conducted between 2001 and 2006; document analysis; and more than 280
interviews conducted with Congolese politicians, military officers, diplomats, and
civil society actors, victims of violence, staff of international organisations, and
foreign observers – in the Congo, France, Belgium, New York, and Washington, DC.
Given the substantial degree of political tension and uncertainty surrounding the
themes of this article, and given the culture of secrecy pervasive in UN and
diplomatic circles, most of the people I interviewed preferred to remain anonymous.
For this reason, I reference only the data obtained through on-record interviews or in
public sources. Unless otherwise indicated, the rest of the information presented in
this article comes from the author’s field observations and anonymous interviews.
Analytical Framework
The paucity of research on the impact of local violence on the viability of the peace
processes constitutes a significant gap in the literature on conflict and conflict
resolution. It raises such questions as: What are the local foundations of peace
processes? How, precisely, do micro-local dynamics contribute to the failure of a
national peace agreement?
Academics and practitioners often share the same flawed interpretation of conflict
(Kalyvas, 2003). Most analysts perceive local dynamics ‘as a mere (and rather
irrelevant) local manifestation of the central cleavage’ and local actors as mere
‘replicas of central actors’ (Kalyvas, 2003:481). Thus, academics who attempt to
explain the success or failure of peace agreement implementation largely neglect the
local preconditions for civil war settlements. They usually focus on macro-level
parameters, such as the commitment to peace from a ‘major or regional power’
(Hampson, 1996; Downs & Stedman, 2002), the role of international peacekeeping
operations (Hampson, 1996; many contributors to Stedman, Rothchild et al. 2002;
Walter, 2002), or the existence of signed peace agreements and power-sharing pacts
(Hampson, 1996; Walter, 2002). Most of these studies also analyse each warring
party as a monolith (Wood, 2002:5), overlooking the impact of intra-party disputes,
which, in fact, have crucial consequences (Stedman, 1997; Zartman & Rasmussen,
1997). They miss a critical point: local issues are specific and their dynamics are
distinct from those at the national level (Kalyvas, 2003, 2006).
To illuminate the multiple layers and connections among conflicts at different levels,
I build on Kalyvas’s (2003, 2006) analysis that local and national dimensions of
violence interact through two distinct mechanisms: cleavage and alliance. ‘Cleav-
age’ refers to the ‘overarching issue dimension’ – this is, for example, ideology,
ethnicity, religion, or class – that links actors at the centre to actors on the ground
(Kalyvas, 2003:476). ‘Alliance’ is a concept that links the central actors’ quest for
national power to the local actors’ quest for local advantages. It ‘entails a transaction
between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the latter with
external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive local advantage; in exchange
the former rely on local conflicts to recruit and motivate supporters and obtain local
control, resources, and information’ (Kalyvas, 2003:486).
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In so doing, I challenge a prominent mono-causal interpretation of the Congolese
conflict and transition to peace. Building on Collier and Hoeffler’s ‘Greed and
Grievance’ argument (2001), journalists and academics alike often reduce the
motivations for violence in the Congo to a desire to exploit the massive Congolese
natural resources (see for example Naidoo, 2003; Olsson, 2004, and Samset, 2002 for
the war period and Global Witness, 2005 and Nest, 2006 for the transition). I
consider not only explanations of violence based on resources (or other economic
agendas) but also on political and social causes. I show that violence in the Congo,
although motivated in part by ‘greed’ (the exploitation of natural resources), is also
motivated by ‘grievances’: issues related to social status, identity, and political
power.
Identifying the Different Loci of Violence during the Transition
Regional Causes of Local Violence
In March 2005, the UN Security Council denounced Rwanda’s and Uganda’s
continuing involvement in supporting the armed groups responsible, among other
things, for the perpetuation of violence in the Congo. In particular, Rwandan troops
continued to operate in the Kivus and in 2004 the tactics of hit-and-run became
common along the border regions (International Crisis Group, 2005:21-22; Institute
for Security Studies, 2004; Romkema, 2004; UN Security Council, 2004). Three
important incentives were at the root of the Rwandan involvement in the Congo
during the transition: first, the threat posed by the continued presence of Rwandan
Hutu militias; second, the problem of ethnic hatred against Congolese
Rwandophones; and third, the appeal of the Kivus’ mineral resources.
During the transition, armed groups affiliated with the Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda, or FDLR), a
Rwandan rebel group composed mostly of ethnic Hutus, remained heavily present
in the Kivus.1 They included combatants from the 1994 genocide as well as family
members of the combatants, refugees, and political opponents forced to flee by
Kagame’s crackdown on opposition parties. The Rwandan government often
complained about this continued FDLR presence in the Congo and emphasised the
threat it posed to its country. Kigali, therefore, threatened several times – notably in
November 2004 and in April 2005 – to invade the Congo again should Congolese
and international actors fail to solve the FDLR problem. However, only a small
number of FDLR had been active during the genocide and the relatively small group
of FDLR combatants remaining in the Congolese forests did not seem to pose a real
danger to Rwanda. Therefore, many Congolese and international observers claimed
that Kigali complained about the FDLR presence in the Congo purely to find a
pretext to come back into the Kivus in order to pursue Rwanda’s true interests:
protecting Rwandophones and exploiting the Congo’s resources.
‘Rwandophone’ means Kinyarwanda-speaking people. In the Congolese context,
the term is used to refer to Congolese of Rwandan ancestry (both Hutus and Tutsis).
Although many of them descend from families who arrived in the Congo before or
during the colonisation period, or shortly after independence (1960), their
Congolese citizenship has been hotly contested for the past fifty years. These ethnic
tensions have led to local ethnic massacres, such as in Masisi in 1993, and they were
one of the reasons for the 1998 war. During the transition, the members of the


































and abuse, and many Congolese groups contested their very right to live on
Congolese territory. This hatred fed Rwanda’s alleged concerns for a potential
‘genocide’ of Rwandophone communities. Several times during the transition –
notably after the May-June 2004 fighting in Bukavu and the August 2004 massacre
in Gatumba – Rwanda threatened to go back into the Congo if the Congolese
President, Joseph Kabila did not take appropriate measures to protect the
Rwandophone minority and stop the anti-Rwandophone propaganda. The ‘indig-
enous’ Congolese – as ethnic groups that are native to the eastern Congo refer to
themselves in order to emphasise that ethnic groups such as Rwandophone are
foreign – felt deep resentment toward Rwanda because of its lengthy occupation of
the eastern Congo. Thus these Rwandan threats reinforced the anti-Rwandophone
feelings among the vast majority of the Congolese people and led to further
discrimination and violence against Rwandophones.
Economic motivations also seemed largely to account for Rwanda’s interest in the
eastern Congo. UN and non-governmental organisations noted the discrepancies
between the very limited mining resources of Uganda and Rwanda, and their
massive exports of cassiterite, coltan, tin, and gold (Global Witness, 2005:4, 24-26;
Pourtier, 2004:4; UN Security Council, 2005b: par 85-86). Global Witness’s (2005)
case study on cassiterite documented how the Rwandan state was involved in this
illegal trafficking: first as the prime beneficiary (the state-owned company Redemi
being the major exporter of tin and cassiterite); and second as an armed actor able to
secure mining sites when necessary. In addition, Rwandan officials and civilians
also benefited from the trafficking because of the ‘important business links’ they had
developed with members of the Democratic Rally for Democracy – Goma
(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Goma, or RCD-G), the rebel group that
controlled most of the eastern Congo during the war and was transformed into a
political party during the transition. This led to sporadic Rwandan involvement,
aimed at influencing or supervising Congolese allies. The six-year conflict had
enabled foreign countries to set up systems of exploitation that could continue
functioning through Congolese proxies even after the Rwandan or Ugandan armies
had withdrawn.
The combination of these security, political, and economic interests led Rwanda to
actively support several armed groups responsible for local violence in the eastern
Congo. At the end of 2003, Rwanda resumed military support to several Kivu
militias (International Crisis Group, 2004). Furthermore, Rwandan officials sup-
ported the renegade military officers Laurent Nkunda and Jules Mutebusi during
the May-June 2004 fighting in Bukavu and afterwards, helping them recruit soldiers
and providing them with heavy arms and ammunition, uniforms, money, and a rear
base in Rwanda to regroup and retreat when necessary (UN Security Council, 2004).
Rwanda also helped the North Kivu Governor, Eugene Seruphuli (a Rwandophone
affiliated with the RCD-G), arm Rwandophone civilians in Masisi and constitute
additional local defence militias.
National Causes of Local Violence
If regional agendas continued to cause violence during the transition, national
dimensions remained similarly influential. The Transitional Government was
mostly characterised by a distrust among the representatives of the different
‘components’ of the transition institutions. These were the eight most powerful
political or military groups at the outset of the civil war, and they had received an


































428 Review of African Political Economy
equal share of representation in the government, the parliament, and the national
administration. The government did not work as a team to manage the transition
and lead the country, but rather as competitive factions bent on overtaking one
another and on enhancing the political, military, symbolic, and financial position of
their own parties. Militarily, each component strived to maintain control over its
former military assets under the umbrella of the newly unified army, the Armed
Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo, or FARDC). The internal antagonisms were such that the
government stopped functioning as an entity during the third year of the transition.
This continuation of high-level hostilities created dire local consequences. In the
eastern provinces, the antagonisms between Kabila and the RCD-G fuelled the
resistance of all former warring parties to the army integration process. The
persistent distrust and lack of integration generated a highly volatile situation in
those territories that continued to be controlled by troops affiliated with different
factions, and led to both small-scale battles and several bouts of large-scale fighting.
The local population was the first to suffer from this fighting: each armed group used
violence to deter villagers from supporting some other faction.
The political struggle at the national level also fuelled the hatred against
Rwandophones; this hatred remained a pervasive source of violence in the eastern
provinces. In Kinshasa, newspapers every day disparaged the Rwandophone
community and their political party, the RCD-G: both were presented as the source
of the war and of all the problems in the transition, and they were depicted as the
‘Trojan horse’ of the abhorred Rwandese. Leaders from all side of the political
spectrum defended a similar point of view, apparently for the sake of electoral
advantage. Fuelling ethnic hatred spared politicians the need to develop real
political platforms. Rwandophone-bashing was an easy way to show one’s
patriotism and to appeal to the majority of the Congolese population. This led to a
vicious circle: existing ethnic tensions encouraged national politicians to use anti-
Rwandophone rhetoric, which further stirred ethnic hatred, which was an
important cause of local violence in the eastern Congo.
In addition, the struggle within the Transitional Government blocked the decision-
making process. This, added to the strong interests most representatives had in
stalling the transition process (to retain their positions of authority and continue to
enrich their coffers, or to benefit from continued immunity from prosecution), caused
the transition to progress at a very slow pace. It meant a continued absence of state
authority in the east, especially in the rural areas. In the absence of state authority,
the justice and police forces acted with impunity. Bias, corruption, and inefficiency
were so widespread that these sectors lost all credibility with the Congolese people.
At the same time, the lack of legitimate state authority in the east encouraged the
continuation of violence, which seemed the easiest road to power and wealth. Thus
civil as well as violent crime (including rape and kidnapping) persisted in many
areas, unhindered by the non-functioning forces of law and order.
The conditions of impunity and the lack of legitimate state authority in the east also
facilitated the illegal exploitation of resources. During the transition, the Congolese
armed forces, the Rwandan rebel militias FDLR, the Congolese local self-defence
militias called Mai Mai, armed forces of the former rebel movement RCD-G, as well
as pro-Ugandan, pro-Rwandan, and criminal groups remained involved in illegal
mining (Global Witness, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2005; Romkema, 2004;


































diamonds, and palm nut crossed the borders every day and evaded the tax
authorities. This situation, in turn, fuelled the absence of state authority in the east:
first, by reinforcing the reluctance of many local strongmen to work in good faith
with the central authorities; and second, by depriving the Transitional Government
of important resources that could have helped it extend its authority.
It also generated local violence in three different ways. First, national actors
competed among themselves as well as with local and foreign armed groups
(notably Mai Mai and FDLR) for the control of mining sites. This led to frequent
fighting over the key mining areas of the Kivus (Global Witness, 2005:4, 8, 16).
Second, illicit exploitation of resources enabled all armed groups to finance their
war efforts, which further fuelled armed conflict (Staibano, 2005:3; UN Security
Council, 2005c). Third, control of mining sites by national or local armed groups
caused massive violence against the local population. Global Witness (2005:10)
documents that in the mining areas of North and South Kivu, all armed groups
committed ‘colossal’ abuses against non-combatants, including ‘killing, rape,
torture, arbitrary arrests, intimidation, mutilation, [and] the destruction or pillage of
private property.’ These abuses were ‘integrally linked to natural resources … as
they were employed as methods by which to gain control either over resource-rich
areas or over the ability to [exploit them].’
In addition, officials in Kinshasa embezzled funds earmarked for the army
integration and for the soldiers’ pay. As a result, the soldiers’ commanders did not
have the resources to remunerate their troops adequately or provide them with basic
supplies and therefore encouraged them to make a living off the local population.
Thus all soldiers (belonging to all components) continued to prey on the local
population throughout the transition. This meant extorting the local residents,
stealing all kinds of valuables in urban areas (money, mobile phones) and harvests
or cattle in rural areas, and beating, raping, torturing, killing, or imprisoning those
who refused to comply. Abuses by soldiers trying to make a living were so widely
reported that they seemed to be the most common form of low-level violence in the
east.
Local Causes of Violence
If regional and national antagonisms continued to generate high levels of violence at
the local level, local conflict was also motivated by distinctly local causes. The main
difference between the war period and the transition was that, during the transition,
these local agendas became increasingly autonomous from the national and
regional tracks.
In the east, at the grassroots level, the problem was not only ‘the most obvious
division, ‘everybody against the [Rwandophones]’ but also the ‘hundreds of
potential divisions, of local problems,’ which were exploited by commanders and
often erupted in violence.2 One of the main actors at the local level was the Mai Mai
militias, local self-defence armed groups formed on the basis of ethnicity throughout
the eastern Congo. The Mai Mai are officially considered a national actor (the Mai
Mai ‘movement’ sent ministers, deputies, and senators to the transition institutions),
but Mai Mai groups have never been unified under a single command structure.
During the transition, just as during the war, the Mai Mai ‘movement’ remained a
loose network of very different militias following various – and often competing –
leaders.
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In North Kivu, South Kivu, and North Katanga, a mosaic of alliances and counter
alliances separated the numerous ethnic groups in each province. The clan and
ethnic tensions were usually articulated in terms of social, economic, and political
issues. Clannish, ethnic, political, and social identities remained extremely fluid
during the transition and individuals often switched allegiance from one group to
another as opportunities arose. The causes of the divisions were intertwined both
with one another and with national and regional agendas.
Political antagonisms at the local level fuelled significant violence. Conflicts of
succession continued to generate tensions similar to those that had existed before
and during the war. During the transition, these were further complicated by the
competition between new and traditional authorities. During the war, many
traditional authorities (village, collectivity, or territory chiefs) had fled, either to
escape ongoing violence or because an armed group had usurped their power. After
the war, the return of the traditional authorities to their territories generated a high
level of hostility.
In the Osso and Bashali collectivities (North Kivu), the Hunde population
reportedly sided with the newly returned traditional chief, himself a Hunde, against
the Hutu chiefs who had seized power during the war; in retaliation the Hutu chiefs
committed ‘a lot of abuses’ against the supporters of their opponents.3 Such conflicts
between new and traditional authorities were not limited to North Kivu. One of the
main problems linked to the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania to South Kivu
was the tension likely to arise with the return of traditional authorities to their area
of origin.4 Similarly, in Nyunzu (North Katanga), people living in the camps for
displaced people were not the lowest-ranking members of their communities but
rather families of local traditional authorities (notably village and collectivity
chiefs). Ordinary citizens had been allowed to go back to their villages, but when the
chiefs tried to do so, the Mai Mai soldiers who had usurped their power threatened
them and forced them to leave again. Articles in the press suggested that this
situation was common throughout Katanga.
In addition to local conflict over traditional power, there was ethnic conflict over
appointments in state institutions by transitional authorities. For example, in the
Shabunda territory (South Kivu) in 2004, the Mai Mai General Padiri (himself a
member of the Tembo ethnic group), who was recognised as a leading figure in the
Mai Mai movement by the transitional authorities, reportedly appointed only Mai
Mai Tembo to important military and administrative positions. This led to several
small-scale fights between the Mai-Mai Tembo and the Mai-Mai Rega, until the Mai
Mai Rega retaliated by chasing the Mai Mai Tembo from Shabunda territory.
In most cases, such political tensions interfaced with economically motivated
hostilities. Political power often guarantees access to land and economic resources,
while access to wealth means, in turn, the availability of resources to buy arms and
reward troops and to secure political power. In particular, the land problems that
had led to massive local violence before and during the war (Mamdani, 2001; Van
Acker & Vlassenroot, 2000; Willame, 1997) remained salient in the eastern Congo
and often constituted the grassroots dimension of local conflicts (UN Mission in the
Congo [Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo, MONUC] 2004).
In South Kivu, land issues were usually the most important source of conflict in rural
areas and further problems were expected with the return of refugees.5 In North


































important source of tension between RCD-G and Mai Mai groups stationed in
Walikale in early 2004.6 In North Katanga, the Bembes reportedly attempted to take
over land in Holoholo and Kalanga areas. Local tensions over land sometimes
erupted into open fighting, such as in Walikale (North Kivu) in June 2004, Bwerema
(South Kivu) in December 2004, and Katogota (South Kivu) in November 2005. They
also greatly impeded the peaceful return of refugees and displaced persons because
those in control of the land after the war threatened to use force to avoid giving it up.
As noted above, competition among fragmented militias for the control of natural
resources also remained a major cause of violence in the Kivus and North Katanga.
Finally, the need to find the means of survival, and the lack of social opportunities,
which had pushed many civilians to enrol in militias during the war (Van Acker &
Vlassenroot, 2000), remained salient during the transition. Before the war, most of
the Congolese population had faced massive poverty and unemployment. In the
east, this situation deteriorated further during the war. Children and teenagers who
had grown up during the war had not received proper schooling and thus were not
well-prepared for pursuing peaceful and productive activities. Land remained
scarce, so young people could not easily acquire fields for farming, and the economic
infrastructure was nonexistent. Outside intervention in the east continued to focus
on humanitarian issues, and very few development projects were funded in the
eastern provinces. In this context, being part of a militia remained the most profitable
option.
Militias also remained the only source of social mobility. Individuals and groups –
such as the youth and the pygmies – who, because of the war, had attained a status
that was previously denied to them, had strong incentives to perpetuate the violent
situation that had enabled them to reach a higher social position. Similarly, many
Mai Mai chiefs knew that, should peace return to the Congo, they would lose their
status as all-powerful, kinglike leaders and become once again mere soldiers – often
ill-trained and illiterate. This was one of their main motivations for refusing to be
integrated into the army. This persistent violence compounded the danger faced by
those perceived as having wronged their neighbours or their communities during
the war. It allowed the threat of retaliation to remain the main reason why, two years
after the beginning of the transition, many refugees and displaced persons had
failed to return to their home villages in the Kivus and North Katanga.7
Local Dimensions of the FDLR Problem
These economic and political issues often motivated local alliances with the
Rwandan rebel militias, the FDLR. Given the number of atrocities for which the
FDLR is responsible, its leaders’ claims that their troops were often well integrated
in the Kivus may have sounded like mere propaganda. However, the FDLR did
benefit from the support of many local strongmen.
The Mai Mai, their allies from the war period, often continued to collaborate with the
FDLR in both the Kivus during the transition – hiding them, conducting business
with them, or enlisting them in their factional fighting against other Mai Mai groups.
During the transition, the FDLR even enrolled new allies: soldiers of the Congolese
armed forces previously loyal to President Joseph Kabila or to the former rebel leader
Jean-Pierre Bemba. A UN official working with the FDLR (interviewed in 2005)
reported that these Congolese soldiers were ‘afraid of the FDLR’ and therefore
refused to attack them. Because they also were not paid and were poorly disciplined,
they were easily bribed by the FDLR into assisting them in taxing and looting the
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Congolese population (such as in Shabunda territory) or in turning a blind eye to
their presence (such as in the South Kivu territories of Kilembwe and Lemera).
In addition to armed forces, local administrative authorities throughout the eastern
Congo also collaborated with the FDLR. In the Lubero and Walikale territories
(North Kivu), for example, the authorities of the RCD-Kisangani/Liberation
Movement largely tolerated the presence of FDLR members, provided they refrained
from raping and killing while they looted villages. In South Kivu, there was
important collusion and economic ties between FDLR and local authorities. In
places like Rutchuru, Lemera, and Kilembwe, Congolese inhabitants reportedly
accepted the FDLR living on their territory as long as they refrained from
harassment.
The presence of FDLR in the Congo, which usually has been presented as a national
or regional problem, was thus very much grounded in local dynamics, which
reinforced national and regional interaction. Local alliances were key to perpetuat-
ing the FDLR presence on Congolese territory and the violence associated with it. To
a high ranking Rally-FDLR official (2005), Rwandan Hutu refugees ‘would not have
been able to survive’ without the good relationships they had developed with the
local population. FDLR groups were too small and too divided internally; they could
not have remained on Congolese territory if they had been required to survive on
their own while fighting back all Congolese military forces. On the contrary, support
by local armed groups enabled the Rwandan combatants to recruit allies, to fight
their opponents, and to hide from the Congolese armed forces (usually former
members of the Congolese Rally for Democracy) and UN troops determined to attack
them. That local authorities tolerated the FDLR on mining territories also enabled
the Rwandan militias to find the economic resources they needed to buy arms and
continue fighting.8 Moreover, this local collaboration enhanced the quality of life for
the FDLR on Congolese territory and therefore diminished their incentives to
peaceably return to Rwanda. Support by local authorities, local forces, and
sometimes local populations allowed FDLR forces to live near Congolese villages. In
selected places such as Rutchuru, Shabunda, and Kilembwe, this enabled FDLR
families to trade goods and services with the surrounding population. In other
places, it provided the FDLR with the opportunity to live off the surrounding
Congolese population through looting. Kidnappings, rapes, tortures, and massa-
cres accompanied their raids on Congolese villages.
Local Dimensions of the Rwandophone Issue
Contrary to a commonly held belief, the problem of the Rwandophone minority
status, which had the potential of jeopardising the regional and national peace
settlements, also carried distinctively local stakes. Before the war, the Rwandophone
problem was rooted in local conflicts around land and traditional power (Mamdani,
2001; Willame, 1997). During the transition, Rwandophones’ claims on traditional
political power – and their associated claims on land – continued to fuel anti-
Rwandophone sentiments and to generate violence. Tensions were especially high
in provinces where the Rwandophones constituted the largest ethnic group and
thus could easily seize local power, such as in Masisi. In South Kivu, Rwandophones
were a minority in all territories but their claim of entitlement to traditional
representation also met with large resistance. There, the reason was that during the
war the rebel movement Congolese Rally for Democracy – Goma had carved up a few
territories such as Minembwe where Banyamulenges (Rwandophones native to the


































transition the Banyamulenges refused to abide by the requests of the ‘indigenous’
communities to return to the pre-war territorial arrangements.
All throughout South Kivu, these political and economic motivations were
multiplied exponentially by the departure of Banyamulenges from Uvira and
Bukavu in June 2004, after fighting took place there between Rwandophone and
troops of the newly unified Congolese Armed Forces. Those who fled vacated the
high positions and nice houses they had acquired during the war. ‘Indigenous’
Congolese took over these jobs and houses, refused to restore them to the
Banyamulenges who returned in late 2004, and tried to discourage the refugees from
coming back and threatening their new wealth and authority. Given these local
political and economic stakes, the return of the Banyamulenges who had fled
generated many incidents of violence in 2004 and 2005. The most publicised one
took place in September 2004 when, after 160 Banyamulenge refugees (mostly
women and children) were massacred in a refugee camp in Gatumba (Burundi),
reportedly by Congolese militiamen, hundreds of Banyamulenge refugees tried to
return to the Congo from Burundi. They were blocked at the border for several days
and obliged to stay in the ‘neutral zone’ between the two countries. The first group
that succeeded in re-entering the Congo was stoned by an angry mob that reportedly
had been organised by local authorities. After that incident, a few Banyamulenges
trickled back into South Kivu, but many stayed in Burundi for over a year, afraid to
go back.
In sum, during the transition, just as during the war, local violence was motivated
not only by top-down causes (regional or national) but also by bottom-up agendas,
whose main instigators were villagers, traditional chiefs, community chiefs, or
ethnic leaders. The resulting violence was not coordinated on a large scale, but
rather it was the product of fragmented, micro-level militias, who tried to advance
their own agenda at the village or district level. The following section illuminates the
relationships between regional, national, and local dimensions of violence in two
eastern provinces.
Interaction between Local, National & Regional Motivations:
Understanding the Joint Production of Violence
There was an interaction between the local and the national and regional levels -
namely alliances between local actors and national and regional actors. However,
throughout the transition, local actors and local agendas became increasingly
autonomous and disconnected from the national and regional tracks. In North Kivu,
contrary to the commonly held belief, local cleavages remained an important,
autonomous source of violence. In North Katanga, local agendas were disconnected
from the national and regional tracks and they proved more influential than
national and regional issues in generating armed conflict. They led to clashes that
neither national nor regional actors could stop, which in turn could have
jeopardised the regional and national settlements.
North Kivu: Master Cleavages & Local Alliances
During the transition, North Kivu (see map over) was marred by the combination of
tensions among its eight ethnic communities – mostly caused by land and
citizenship issues – and by conflicts between the five armed groups present in the
province (Democratic Rally for Democracy-Goma or RCD-G, Democratic Rally for
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Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement or RCD-K/ML and government forces,
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda or FDLR, Mai Mai, and local defence
forces). Most sources have characterised the violence in terms of the master ethnic
cleavage (Rwandophones versus other ethnic communities), neatly superimposed
and running along the same dividing line as the political cleavage (Kabila versus
RCD-G). This reading of the conflict overlooked the key role of local tensions in
generating violence.
After large-scale fighting took place around Bukavu in June 2004 and the RCD-G lost
control of the South Kivu province, and while the political struggle between Kabila
and the RCD-G continued unabated throughout the whole Congo (in particular in
Kinshasa), the military conflict between these two enemies continued in one last
place: North Kivu. The ‘Petit Nord’ (the southern part of North Kivu) remained the
last stronghold of the RCD-G. The former rebel movement maintained absolute
control there. The governor (Eugène Seruphuli) and the regional military com-
mander were both RCD-G officials. Up until 2006, rank and files of the Congolese
armed forces were not enlisted from each component but instead were exclusively
former RCD-G soldiers. They were supported by the three-thousand-strong Local
Defence Forces, a predominantly Hutu militia that governor Seruphuli created
during the war and that Rwandan forces trained. North Kivu’s financial revenues
remained in the province instead of going to the capital, and pro-RCD-G
communities continued to hold the economic and social power of the province. As a
result, from the Bukavu crisis onward, national politicians – except for those
belonging to the RCD-G – thought of North Kivu as the exception: the province least
integrated into the transition process and the last holdout, the place Kabila needed
to take control of in order to unify the rest of the country. The regional dimension was
also present – although less so than during the wars. Rwanda reportedly supported
the RCD-G with its financial, military, and political might, and occasionally
engaged in fighting against the ethnic Nandes, the Mai Mai, and the rebel Rwandan
militias alongside RCD-G troops.
In addition to the soldiers that it progressively managed to send to North Kivu, the
Kabila government’s strength in its struggle against the RCD-G in this province
came in large part from the allies it had there: the Democratic Rally for Democracy-
Kisangani/Liberation Movement or RCD-K/ML, which kept the RCD-G busy on the
northern front (along the same front line as during the war); and the Mai Mai, which
fought against the RCD-G from within its area of control. Importantly, during the
transition both of these allies were anti-RCD-G for provincial and local reasons
rather than because of any convictions about the master conflict between Kabila and
the RCD-G.
Indeed, since colonisation, North Kivu had progressively seen a strong polarisation
between its two most populous ethnic groups, the Banyarwandas (Rwandophones
from the North Kivu province) and the Nandes, over the control of the province
(Willame, 1997). During the war, the elites of these competing ethnic groups each
controlled half of the province and allied themselves with different warring parties
– the RCD-K/ML and Kabila for the Nandes, the RCD-G for the Banyarwandas.
During the first months of the transition, the antagonism had reached such a point
that the Banyarwandas and Nandes suspected each other of harbouring plans to
eradicate the other. In May 2004, the province was finally reunified administratively
and put under the leadership of Eugene Seruphuli. However, this did not assuage


































Rwandophone ethnic groups living in Goma complained that the RCD-G’s rule had
a strong ethnic flavour, and it continued to be associated with Banyarwanda
domination.9 As a result, up until the end of the transition, Nande Mai Mai groups
remained extremely active in the ‘Grand Nord’ for fear of a potential Banyarwanda
invasion from the south. Despite administrative reunification, the front line between
RCD-G and RCD-K/ML forces (allied with Rwanda’s and Kabila’s troops,
respectively) remained active. Numerous skirmishes took place there in 2004, 2005,
and 2006, and they erupted in a large-scale confrontations around Kanyabayonga
in December 2004, Rutchuru in January 2006, and Sake in August 2006.
In addition, Kabila could also count on local tensions between ‘indigenous’ and
Rwandophone communities to recruit local allies, both political (as in the Civil
Society party) and military (as in the Mai Mai militias) to fight against the RCD-G
from within its area of control. In Masisi and Rutchuru, for example, Civil Society
representatives and local militias had two reasons for fighting against anything
perceived as part of a Rwandophone movement (MONUC, 2004). First, the Hundes
and the Nyangas felt that they were the only communities with a rightful claim on
traditional (and political) representation. Although the Hutus were the majority
population of the Masisi territory and demanded the right to adequate representa-
tion at the political and traditional levels, the Hundes and Nyangas saw them as
‘immigrants’ who had arrived during the colonisation or after independence and
therefore had no legal claim on traditional power. As explored above, this led to
major tensions regarding who could be named chief of a village or a collectivity, such
as in the Osso and Bashili collectivities.


































436 Review of African Political Economy
Second, Rwandophones (mostly Tutsis) owned about 80 per cent of the land as a
result of transactions they had made under Mobutu. However, the Hundes and the
Nyangas claimed that the land was traditionally theirs: Mobutu should not have
been allowed to sell it because it belonged to traditional authorities. The issue of land
ownership was further complicated by the fact that many Tutsis had fled Masisi in
the 1990s to escape the ongoing massacres, and either had abandoned their land or
sold it at an artificially low price. When they came back after the 1996 and 1998 wars,
they found their lands occupied and reportedly took all of it back, by force if
necessary, including the land that had been sold legitimately.10
These local antagonisms over political and economic issues were carried onto the
military stage, particularly the conflict between the Mai Mai (allied with FDLR) and
both the Local Defence Forces militia and the RCD-G. The Mai Mai represented the
‘indigenous’ communities, whereas the RCD-G and Local Defence Forces were
accused of siding with the Hutus and the Tutsis. Fighting became more frequent and
more violent after the 2004 Bukavu crisis, which generated a complete breakdown of
trust between the RCD-G and the Mai Mai. In October 2004, the situation in Masisi
became so tense that there was once again a real front line within the province, with
both groups committing abuses against people crossing to the other side.
Local agendas regarding traditional power or land, which led to hostilities at the
provincial (Nandes versus Rwandophones) and village (Hutus or Tutsis versus
other communities) levels, were therefore as influential as national and regional
cleavages in generating violence. However, local conflicts were easily reinterpreted
in light of the ethnic and political cleavages, and thus North Kivu politics appeared
to be dominated by these master cleavages. In contrast, in North Katanga the master
cleavages carried very little weight and the local agendas could hardly be
interpreted in light of them.
North Katanga: Uncontrolled Militias Rejecting National Control
The continued insecurity in North Katanga (see map below) was indeed attributable
mostly to local factors, which were disconnected from the national cleavages. At first
glance, it seemed that Kabila had asserted his control over the province. General
Dunia, posted at the southern tip of South Kivu, reportedly served to protect Katanga
from enemy attacks from the north should Rwandans resume their attack in the
Kivus. Kabila had apparently ensured the loyalty of the administrative and military
authorities in the region, either by replacing them or by letting them switch sides. In
2004, the Congolese armed forces stationed in the region were supposedly a mixture
of former RCD-G soldiers, Mai Mai groups, and governmental forces. However, this
alleged governmental control was a fallacy. In reality, state authority was absent
from North Katanga. Even if the security situation there showed a tremendous
improvement compared to the war period, many areas in the territory remained
plagued by micro-local, uncontrolled armed groups (mostly former Mai Mai), who
spent most of their time harassing the civilian population and fighting against the
FARDC or among themselves.
During the transition, a rupture indeed appeared between the North Katanga Mai
Mai and the Transitional Government. Katangan Mai Mai thought that they had not
been adequately rewarded for having saved Lubumbashi, the capital of the Katanga
province and the second largest city of the Congo, from the RCD-G and Rwandan
troops during the war. In addition, Mai Mai members of the Transitional


































either represented by them or bound by the agreements they signed (including the
agreement to integrate Mai Mai troops into the Congolese armed forces). The Mai
Mai demand for integration in the Congolese armed forces was therefore far less in
Katanga than in the Kivus. The problem was further compounded by the reluctance
of Kabila’s component to integrate the Mai Mai groups active on the government side
of the frontline during the war into the Congolese armed forces. To Kabila’s
followers, these Mai Mai groups had fought government forces instead of the foreign
invaders; they were therefore enemies.11
The top military commanders of the Congolese armed forces first tried to convince
the Mai Mai to join the unified army, but they had limited success. Thus they
changed strategy in late 2004 and organised military operations in many Katangan
territories against the remaining un-integrated forces. It led to additional skirmishes
and their associated cortege of insecurity and violation of human rights. It also
heightened the fallout between the Mai Mai and the Congolese armed forces. The
consequences were two-fold. First, in late 2004 and 2005, journalists and
humanitarian workers reported constant fighting between the Congolese armed
forces and Katangan Mai Mai, notably around Mitwaba, Kongolo, and Malemba
Nkulu. Second, state authority totally collapsed in North Katanga, which enhanced
the impunity for human rights violations and illegal actions, and therefore further
facilitated violence by all armed groups.
In addition to the tensions between the Mai Mai and the Congolese armed forces,
frequent fighting took place among the Mai Mai militias over a combination of
political, economic, and ethnic antagonisms. At the territory, or village level, Mai
Mai groups strived to maintain their power over their former areas of control in order
to dominate the administrative and traditional powers, manage mineral-rich areas,
divert taxes, and impose all kinds of fines on the population. These political and
economic agendas interacted with numerous ethnic tensions: hatred of pygmies and
‘Kasaian’ groups remained widespread while, in each district, the amount of other
clan, tribal, or ethnic rivalries continued to simmer away. Unconfirmed information
also held that provincial and national actors enhanced these local antagonisms. The
result was that fighting among Mai Mai militias and abuses against the local
population reached such a point that, near Mitwaba, a new ‘popular self defence
force’ was created in order to protect villagers against the Mai Mai – which was
ironic because, initially, the Mai Mai militias were born as popular self defence
forces tasked with protecting their villages.
During the transition, local agendas were therefore the prime causes of continued
violence in North Katanga. National cleavages had very little influence: RCD-G
military and administrative authorities had either disappeared or switched sides,
and there were no Rwandophones to harass. Regional cleavages were similarly
non-influential because foreign armed groups had left the province. The only form of
outside influence on North Katanga was an alleged control or manipulation of Mai
Mai groups by Kabila and his advisors. Several UN and diplomatic interviewees
claimed that Kabila’s advisors manipulated local antagonisms in order to pit Mai
Mai groups against one another, but they could not articulate clearly the advisor’s
motivations for this manipulation. Katangans usually identified the desire to benefit
from the illegal exploitation of resources as the main cause for national involvement
in their province. However, none of my interviewees could provide any concrete
evidence to support their claims.
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Conclusion
My analysis suggests that peace builders involved in the Congolese transition
should have addressed local violence for two main reasons. First, the humanitarian
cost of local antagonisms that turned violent was staggering. Second, the neglect of
local issues could lead only to incomplete and unsustainable peace settlements.
Local manifestations of violence, although often related to national or regional
struggles, were also precipitated by distinctively local problems. These included
conflict over land, mineral resources, traditional power, local taxes, and the relative
social status of specific groups and individuals. Even issues usually presented as
regional questions (such as the FDLR problem) or national ones (such as ethnic
tensions with Congolese Rwandophones) had significant local components, which
fuelled and reinforced the regional and national dimensions.
Local, national, and regional dimensions of violence remained closely interlinked in
most of the eastern Congo. Local agendas provided national and regional actors
with local allies, who were crucial in maintaining military control, continuing
resource exploitation, and persecuting political or ethnic enemies. Local tensions
could also jeopardise the national and regional reconciliation: for example, by
motivating violence against the Rwandophone minority or allowing a strong FDLR
presence in the Kivus. In addition, during the transition, some local conflicts became
autonomous from the national and regional tracks, most notably in South Kivu and
North Katanga. There, local disputes over political power, economic resources
(especially land and mining sites), and social status led to clashes that no national
or regional actors could stop. Thus, addressing local issues was key to ending
violence and to ensuring the stability of the national and regional settlements. Peace
building action was required not only at the national and regional level but also
locally.
Concretely, international actors could include local conflict in peace processes by
slightly modifying their usual approach to peace building. In all war and post-war
contexts, policy-makers should commission applied research to illuminate both the
distinctive local dynamics of violence and the local underpinnings of national (and
potentially international) tensions. Based on this analysis, international actors
should step up their interventions on local conflict in two different but complemen-
tary ways. First, donors should increase the funding available for international and
local non-governmental organisations specialised in local conflict resolution, either
by modifying their assistance priorities or by increasing their aid budgets. To ensure
that the additional money funds efficient conflict-resolution programs, donors
should build up structures that can identify reliable local peace builders in the
provinces as well as in the capital. Second, whenever civil society actors are ill-
equipped to address the local tensions (such as when violence is caused by military
antagonisms), international political and military actors should step in. The
intervention of diplomats and political or military UN staff in local conflict would,
on the one hand, deter local warlords and, on the other hand, signal to these
warlords a possibility for assistance – and therefore increase the estimated peace
dividends.
Séverine Autesserre is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Barnard College,
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currently finalising a book entitled Local Violence, International Indifference? The
Failure of Peace Building in the Congo. Parts of this article were previously published
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Endnotes
1. In this article, I use FDLR to refer to all Hutu refugees based in the eastern Congo, including the
few not associated with the FDLR movement.
2. Citations from an author’s interview with Hans Romkema, head of Life and Peace Institute,
Bukavu, 2004.
3. Author’s interview with Azile Tanzi, head of mission of Campagne Pour la Paix, Goma, 2005.
4. Author’s interview with Jean-Charles Dupin, Humanitarian Advisor for the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Bukavu, 2005.
5. Author’s interview with Professor Séverin Mugangu Matabaro, Universite Catholique de Bukavu,
2006.
6. On Masisi: author’s interview with Anders Vatn, head of Mission for the Norwegian Refugee
Council, Goma, 2005.
7. Author’s interview with Vatn, 2005.
8. The incentive to stay in the Congo was all the stronger because the dictatorial nature of the Kigali
regime and its harsh treatment of political opponents gave Rwandan Hutu refugees in the Congo
little hope for livable conditions in Rwanda. It was further reinforced by the harsh discipline
implemented by FDLR top commanders, who would lose the basis of their power if FDLR
combatants and civilians left the Congo; many leaders intimidated and sometimes killed the
potential deserters they had identified in their ranks.
9. Author’s interview with Tanzi, 2005.
10. Author’s interview with Tanzi, 2005.
11. Author’s interview with Nawezi Karl, University of Kinshasa, October 2004.
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Banyamulenge:  Congolese of Rwandan ancestry living in South Kivu.
Banyarwanda:  Congolese of Rwandan ancestry living in North Kivu.
FARDC:  Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo/Armed Forces of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (integrated national army during the transition).
FDLR:  Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda/Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda (Rwandan rebel group composed mostly of ethnic Hutus based in the eastern Congo).
Kabila, Joseph:  Son of late president Laurent-Désiré Kabila. President of the Congo since 2001.
Mai Mai: Local militias formed on ethnic basis throughout the eastern Congo.
MONUC:  Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo/United Nations Organization
Mission in the Congo.
RCD-G:  Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Goma/Congolese Rally for Democracy –
Goma (main rebel group during the 1998 war, controlled most of the eastern Congo. Transformed
into political party during the transition).
RCD-K/ML:  Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Kisangani / Mouvement de Libération –
Congolese Rally for Democracy – Kisangani / Liberation Movement (small rebel group during the
1998 war, controlled part of North Kivu. Transformed into political party during the transition).
Rwandophones:  Kinyarwanda-speaking people. In the Congolese context, term used to refer to
the Congolese of Rwandan ancestry (both Hutus and Tutsis).
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